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Abstract This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and
Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very
influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous
interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been compara-
tively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of
the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical
principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific conventions, where these
may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that
similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific
historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue,
emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective
understanding of science, freedom, and democracy.
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Introduction: perception and scientific knowledge
Reflection about scientific knowledge cannot ignore perception. One can either be
of the opinion that the senses are the golden path to knowledge; in the philosophical
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tradition, this is the position of sensationalism and phenomenology. Or one can
argue conversely that the senses impede our progress toward knowledge and are
irrelevant at the least; this position has been held by various forms of rationalism. In
this paper, I am interested less in this philosophical debate, which has been
magisterially analyzed by Martin Jay (1994) with respect to French rationalism in
the twentieth century, than in the relevance of perception for theories of scientific
knowledge. More specifically, I am concerned with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of
thought styles and Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Both concepts have
been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to
numerous interpretations. It has also been pointed out by several commentators that
sensory perception and theories of perception have been quite important for Fleck
and Polanyi in the way that sensory perception represents an indispensable basis
for knowledge (Smith 1988; Jha 2002; Zittel 2012). More precisely—scientific
knowledge does not essentially differ in its process from perception and must thus
be seen as a genuinely human activity. Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology
and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less
along the path of logical principles than along the path of accepting or rejecting
specific conventions. Categories that have since become canonical such as thought
style, thought collective (Denkstil, Denkkollektiv) or tacit knowledge cannot be
understood in their theoretical origin without reference to the psycho-physiology of
the senses. Although Fleck’s and Polanyi’s orientation toward perception is well
known, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively
analyzed. In the following, I want to show that similarities and differences between
Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in
which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of
perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science,
freedom, and democracy.
Before examining this—let’s say—scopic epistemology more closely in the
following, I would like to begin by roughly sketching the alternative theory,
according to which the senses are more or less excluded from knowledge
generation. As far as I can see, there have been two major strategies to denigrate
perception. The first one is based on the idea that media, instruments, and
apparatuses represent a fundamental intervention in the process of perception. What
we perceive is an effect of material construction and a function of these instruments.
Accordingly, there is a medial a priori of perception and thus also of knowledge. We
are no longer masters of our view of the world which we have delegated to
instruments. Instruments have replaced the eye, or to put it differently—they are the
true eye of the scientist, who no longer needs to rely on deceptive, unreliable senses.
This position was maintained by the nineteenth-century astronomer Jules Janssen
when he writes, the camera is ‘‘the true retina of the scientist’’ (Janssen 1888).
Photography may accomplish what the eye cannot, namely produce the reliable
image that can be stored and reproduced. Janssen eliminated the eye of the observer
but not the scopic principle. Knowledge remained to be understood in terms of
perception, even if perception was regarded as a trait of the instrument.
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In French epistemology of the twentieth century, however, the scopic principle
was abandoned in general.1 It was Gaston Bachelard, who placed the progress of
scientific knowledge in radical contrast to sensory perception. For Bachelard,
knowledge proceeds against sight, against the continuous, the obvious, all that is
close at hand; it is the result of the ‘‘rupture epistemologique,’’ thus representing a
break with ruling convention. Contemporary science—Bachelard is referring above
all to physics—is distinguished by the fact that it has broken with the pre-history of
sensory evidence. According to him, science thinks through the apparatus, not
through sense organs (Bachelard 1951, 84). The radicality of this position consists
in the fact that the point is no longer to characterize the sense organs as derivatives,
nor to assume the converse, namely that instruments are simply the better sense
organs (Kittler 1999, 22–32). This position holds rather that the senses should be
excluded from the epistemic process altogether.
The second strategy to abandon perception has been to develop a logic of
scientific knowledge production. Thomas Kuhn’s famous article about the Logic of
Discovery or Psychology of Research alludes to this point. On the one hand,
psychology assumes that the sources of knowledge lie in the researcher, while on
the other hand the logic of discovery contends that intersubjectively linkable
structures—such as objectivity, proof, rationality, or even logic are the primary
determinants of the fundamentals of epistemology (Kuhn 1970, 22). With this
differentiation Kuhn referred implicitly to the famous distinction between the
‘‘context of discovery’’ and the ‘‘context of justification,’’ which was drawn in the
programmatic statement of the Vienna Circle and fully developed by Hans
Reichenbach (Carnap et al. 1981, 307; Reichenbach 1962, 231). Reichenbach and
his colleagues in Vienna aimed at separating the contingencies of personality,
passion, intuition, and local environment characteristic of the context of discovery
of scientific knowledge from the logical, objective, rational context of justification.
The first, with all of its subjective components, including sensory perception, has,
according to Reichenbach, no place in a theory of science, because subjective
factors will not yield general statements.
Reichenbach and other logical empiricists believed models for such generaliza-
tions are to be found in physical propositions. Rudolf Carnap, for example,
maintained that ‘‘[i]n physics we can easily see this de-subjectivization which has
already transformed almost all physical terms [physikalische Begriffe] into purely
structural terms [Strukturbegriffe]’’ (Carnap 1928, 20). To be sure, Carnap did not
deny that the objects of scientific study are constituted by the individual. There are
‘‘individual streams of experience’’ which just like perceptions and feeling can be
completely different from person to person, which means that they cannot be
compared. There may be ‘‘certain structural aspects’’ [gewisse Struktureigenschaf-
ten] which are applicable to all experience streams, but it is precisely these qualities
that Carnap traces back to ,,physical world points‘‘ [physikalische Weltpunkte], that
is, between different systems of constitution in which experience streams take place
there is a distinct physical assignment. Only this can allow intersubjectivity and the
1 I understand epistemology as defined by Georges Canguilhem to be the critical investigation of
principles, methods, and results of a science. See Canguilhem 2006, 49–50.
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task of science is to find propositions that are intersubjectively transferable (Carnap
1928, 90–91, 195–200).
Thus Carnap and Reichenbach are by no means such sharp critics of sensory
perception as Bachelard, for they are not of the opinion that trust in the senses
directly hinders epistemological progress. They are convinced however that entirely
different mechanisms of sensory perception are needed in order to create
intersubjectivity. In this regard such heterogeneous thinkers as Bachelard and
Carnap agree after all that perception does not play a significant role within their
respective epistemology of science. Correspondingly, Bachelard was only margin-
ally interested in what was going on in the physiology of the senses in his time.
Carnap, in contrast, favorably acknowledged Gestalt psychology, because he
considered it plausible that elementary experiences constitute the ‘‘basic elements of
our constitutional system’’ (Carnap 1928, 91–93) and that they can be understood as
forms [Gestalten], yet he clearly emphasized the primacy of logic in the creation of
intersubjective knowledge.2
So how does this compare to the opposing, scopic epistemology? Let it be said
from the start, that this latter epistemology does not limit itself in any way to
individual categories such as passion, genius or intuition. Rather it conceives the act
of perception as a continuum from physiological processes to social codes and
interpretations, leading on to the creation of intersubjectivity. To this extent, the
scopic orientation made use of perception and its study in order to avoid a
physicalistic or technological reductionism and to maintain the idea that science is a
genuinely human activity. Just as scientific knowledge cannot rely exclusively on
rationality and logic, it cannot allow itself to be dominated by device driven media
or instruments.
Habsburg Empire
Before addressing Fleck’s and Polanyi’s accounts more specifically, I would like to
point to a number of biographical correspondences between these two authors that
have some significance for an understanding of their respective positions. Both were
born towards the end of the nineteenth Century in the Eastern parts of the Habsburg
Empire—Fleck was born in 1896 in Lemberg and Polanyi in 1891 in Budapest.3
Both were raised in a German-speaking culture of science and both studied
medicine—Fleck in Lemberg, Polanyi in Budapest, before he transferred to the
Technical University in Karlsruhe, in order to study chemistry as well. From then on
their paths diverged. While Fleck stayed in Lemberg—since 1918 called Lwo´w and
belonging to Poland—he went on to study microbiology and became a physician,
2 On Carnap and Gestalt psychology see Kluck 2008, 149–181.
3 The literature on both Fleck and Polanyi is vast. On Fleck, cf. Schnelle 1982, Cohen and Schnelle 1986,
and the Website of the Ludwik Fleck Center at the ETH Zu¨rich (http://www.ludwikfleck.ethz.ch/). On
Polanyi cf. Taussig et al. 2005; Mitchell 2006. Unfortunately, the long-awaited volume on Polanyi by
Nye (2011) was published too late to be considered carefully for this article. I fully agree with Nye’s
central argument, according to which the roots for the social and cultural understanding of science are to
be found in the political context of National Socialism and Communism.
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Polanyi went to one of the centers of science, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for
Chemistry in Berlin Dahlem in order to study with the famous chemist Fritz Haber.
Both actively published in their respective areas of specialization—Fleck, however,
began in the 1920s to write and publish epistemological papers, mainly in Polish,
but also in German, especially his main opus, The Rise and Development of a
Scientific Fact that appeared with Schwabe Verlag Basel in 1935.4
At this time, Polanyi began to publish articles on philosophy of science,
economics and politics. He had become a victim of the racist barbarism of National
Socialism and emigrated from Berlin to Manchester in 1933, where he first
continued to work as a physical chemist. National Socialism affected Fleck even
more. In 1941 he was arrested by the SS and landed in Auschwitz and Buchenwald.
He was not murdered because he was useful to the SS as a microbiologist who could
produce a serum against typhoid fever. After the war, Fleck continued his scientific
career first in Poland and later in Israel, where he died in 1961. Until then, he
published widely in the field of immunology and bacteriology, writing only
sporadically on epistemology, probably because he was demoralized by the fact that
his major work remained without resonance. Polanyi finally moved from physical
chemistry to philosophy and sociology of science in the 1940s and became professor
of sociology at the University of Manchester in 1945. His main work, Personal
Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, appeared in 1958, at a time when
he had already achieved some public acclaim.
Two aspects of these biographies seem to me to be worthy of special note and
helpful in situating their respective work. Fleck developed his theory between 1925
and 1935, at a time when National Socialism and the civilizational catastrophe it
unleashed was just beginning to emerge. While Fleck worked at the outer margins
of the scientific European world, Polanyi developed his theories in Manchester, one
of the scientific centers during the Cold War of the late 40s and 50s. This difference
becomes manifest in reference to Gestalt psychology, which played an important
role for both. While Polanyi extensively quotes works from Gestalt psychology,
Fleck only uses the concept without concrete references. Neither Fleck nor Polanyi
was an adherent of Gestalt theory in the strict sense of the word, that is, neither
understood himself as a member of the Gestalt movement. However, both were
interested in sensory perception from a perspective that had been stimulated by
Gestalt psychology, and both exploited it for their theories of knowledge.
Although a more detailed analysis of Gestalt psychology lies beyond the scope
of this paper, I would like to point out that from the 1920s onward, the Gestalt
theory developed by Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Koehler, Kurt Koffka, and some
other psychologists had an enormous impact in a very short period of time. The
fundamental principle is that the perceived Gestalt is not the constructed product of
individual sense data—which in itself would not make sense—but rather Gestalt is
understood as the fundamental unity of perception and thus of the life of the mind
(Ash 1994, 90–91). This principle applies to subjective experience as well as to
neurophysiological processes in the brain. The functions of the brain are analogous
4 A complete bibliography of Fleck’s writings can be found in Fleck 2011, 656–672.
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to perception, experience, intuition and thought, etc. and are to be understood
holistically, and not as an isolated partial function of a random part of the brain.
Gestalt refers then to universal entities that enable us to surmount psychophysical
dualities. Beyond that they have epistemological consequences, for if a scientific
observation or perception has the character of a Gestalt, this means that it is not a
conglomeration of individual observations, but is just somehow there at some point.
The question then remaining is how a Gestalt is formed. Wertheimer spoke of the
variable organization of the field of perception which is linked to determinant
conditions. The conditions are also responsible for specific Gestalt tendencies and
their relation to one another. This is precisely Fleck’s point of departure.
Thought style and Gestalt
There exists a widely disseminated myth about observation and experiment.
The knowing subject figures as kind of conqueror along the lines of Julius
Caesar who wins his battles according to the formula, veni-vidi-vici. We want
to know something, we make the observation or the experiment, and then we
already know it (Fleck 1980, 111).
These are the polemical statements with which Fleck opens the chapter
‘‘Observation, Experiment, Experience’’ of his major work. For Fleck there is no
world out there that is just waiting to be recognized and understood. The
microscopic preparations with which the bacteriologist has to contend on a daily
basis are far too complex and confusing. A first observation or measurement is
always chaotic. It is neither to be understood nor interpreted and thus should not be
reproduced in many cases. Therefore a slow and tedious task begins in order to
determine what one actually sees. The reason for this sobering state of affairs lies,
on the one hand, in the unwieldiness of the unknown object, and in the knowing
subject, on the other. Observation without precondition is psychologically a non-
entity (Unding). Instead Fleck postulates two types of observation: ‘‘a vague initial
visual perception’’ (unklares, anfa¨ngliches Schauen) and ‘‘the direct perception of
form’’ (unmittelbares Gestaltsehen) (Ibid., 121). Initial perception is undirected and
without a goal, it excludes nothing and perceives nothing, it is explorative and
fragmentary with no recourse to memory or experience. The perception of form, on
the other hand, is directed at something; it has a closed unity and presupposes
experience in a specific field of knowledge. This experience constitutes an element
of the style of thought which Fleck defines as encompassing the entirety of mental
preparations that enable us to see certain types of Gestalt and not others. When one
first looks at something, all possibilities are still open, but when one perceives form
directly, they are more or less fixed.
Those familiar with the history of attentiveness may be reminded of Fleck’s
typology of the differentiation between attentiveness and distraction that was of
great significance for psychophysiology and the cultural theory of his time (Hagner
1998; Crary 1999). Fleck however goes beyond the theory of attentiveness by means
of the concept of the perception of form. Coherent scientific observation and its
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understanding within the framework of a broader theoretical context function
according to the principle of Gestalt and the relations among forms. That one form
or Gestalt is visible rather than another is explained by what Wertheimer called
‘‘conditions.’’ The essential point in Fleck’s theory is that he gives these conditions
a social turn. Education, habit, and belonging to a particular collective of like-
minded thinkers make it impossible to recognize an object as Gestalt if this object is
incompatible with the corresponding thought style.
‘‘On the one hand, a thought style that has developed in a certain way enables one to
see many forms and many applicable facts; on the other hand, it renders the seeing of
other forms and other facts impossible’’ (Fleck 1980, 122). Fleck explicitly insists
against Carnap that a thought-style is not an absolute norm of thought valid for all
possible fields of knowledge. Carnap had introduced the concept of thought style in a
context that was to make the fundamentally strict, mathematical-physical approach of
the natural scientist also viable for the philosopher (Carnap 1928, iv). For Fleck there is
no such thing as a generally articulated thought style that is generally applicable for
observation because the thought collective constitutes the social conditions of
scientific knowledge. An isolated researcher without a thought style and without
presuppositions would be blind and thoughtless. He would not be able to come up with
any new thoughts, because no Gestalt can take shape in him. And there is no prosthetic
device that can change this rule in any way. Even instruments such as the microscope
are constituents of the thought style and are not capable of bringing about a change in
the same Gestalt from one moment to the next. A revolution of technical devices
cannot come about according to Fleck, because the use of instruments leads to an
expansion of all possible visible objects, producing confusion. That this plethora of
possibilities is reduced to a controllable repertoire is not a question of the instrument,
but of convention. Under no conditions does one see Gestalt immediately and without
mediation. Rather, it is the thought-style that has to come into motion in order that
scientific innovation may evolve (Fleck 1983a, 78, 81).
Therefore, Fleck pursues—as he concedes in a text written after World War II—a
holistic approach which he derives from the psychology of perception.5 We
recognize a person or a specific facial expression without being able to explain
which detail is specific or characteristic. What is more, it is imperative that we can
forget these elements again. ‘‘Otherwise we cannot see the forest for the trees and
the syllables do not allow us to recognize words and sentences’’ (Fleck 1983b, 149,
154). This independence of the whole from its parts in the process of perception is
also a decisive point for Michael Polanyi in his theory.
The tacit dimension of Gestalt
In order to exemplify the concept of tacit knowledge, Polanyi often has recourse to
the mechanisms of attentiveness. Through the focusing of attentiveness a holistic
image is generated while in the background we can be conscious of the individual
5 The sources on perception and psychology available to Fleck remain unclear to this day. Cf. Lo¨wy
2008.
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parts that are to a certain degree subsidiary, even if we do not precisely perceive
them at that moment. One could also say that there are two levels of attentiveness at
work here: a lower level for the individual entities and a focused perception of the
larger picture. Only both forms together enable us to move from the individual to
the whole. ‘‘Implicit’’ or ‘‘tacit’’ means for Polanyi that we cannot precisely explain
the details of the relation between subsidiary and focused attentiveness; we cannot
explain the steps from the individual part to the whole. This has to do with a ‘‘mute
power’’ that enables us to experience and to know. Now Polanyi did not stop with
these simple examples from perception, rather he saw implicit knowledge as a
general key that opens all doors to the tower of knowledge.
Tacit knowledge is equally at play in theoretical and practical processes, in the
precision of handcraft, in the art of the experienced diagnostician of medicine, and
in the creative abilities of an artistic or scientific genius. A line of demarcation
between natural and social sciences does not exist: ‘‘Assuming however that
implicit thoughts would constitute an indispensible entity for all knowledge, then
the ideal of obliterating all personal elements of knowledge would mean de facto the
destruction of all knowledge’’ (Polanyi 1985, 27). Polanyi makes his indebtedness to
Gestalt psychology known right at the start of Personal Knowledge, in which he
concedes that it gave him the first impetus for developing a theory of knowledge.
According to this, knowledge does not evolve objectively or independently of the
personality. Rather, the act of knowing and producing knowledge is bound to skills
that cannot be separated from the individual concerned. These skills or this
knowledge are however only effective because they are mute or implicit. At this
point the split between the part and the whole becomes significant. According to
Polanyi, Gestalt psychology has shown ‘‘that we can recognize a physiognomy by
bringing together its parts as we apprehend them, yet without being able to identify
them‘‘(Polanyi 1985, 15). For an understanding of perception and the process of
scientific knowledge it is imperative that we ignore the different parts or elements of
a face or complex problem in order to understand the whole.
Departing from the Gestalt, we can follow the path to the individual parts;
however the reverse does not work: The path from the parts to the whole remains
closed to us. The scientist first develops an adequate orientation toward the problem
and then shifts ‘‘attentiveness away from individual entities toward a complete
entity in which they are combined in a manner that we cannot define’’ (Polanyi
1985, 30). The argument here is very similar to Fleck’s. For Fleck, too, the path
from initial, vague visual perception to the perception of form leads through a tunnel
within which it is impossible to trace the paths exactly. Furthermore, we don’t
exactly know how we got out of the tunnel. Fleck considers this process to be the
result of a social formation that is given through the thought collective. For Polanyi,
this has to do with the ‘‘active forming of experience during the process of acquiring
knowledge’’ (Polanyi 1985, 15). In order to explain this forming, Polanyi has
recourse to categories similar to Fleck’s, namely to skill, experience, training, and
aesthetic judgment. There is no discussion of improving or extending the senses
through prosthetic devices.
Although Polanyi refers at many points to the social and cultural conditioning
of knowledge, he avoids, in contrast to Fleck, any clear discussion of the social
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formation of knowledge. This absence should not be underestimated as it constitutes
a significant difference between the two theories and should be seen in the context
of an idiosyncrasy, namely Polanyi’s ceaseless references to the fact that we cannot
do without personal or implicit parts of knowledge if knowledge as such is not to be
destroyed. The defense of the personality and the absence of the social must be
placed before the backdrop of the historic situation in which Polanyi developed his
theory.
When Polanyi was discussing the relation between brain, mind, and machines
with the mathematician Alan Turing and the philosopher John Z. Young in
Manchester during the late 1940s, two diametrically opposed positions emerged
which were very influential during the ensuing years (Schaffer 1999). While Turing
and Young considered the brain to be a deterministic system that can be completely
described through its initial state and through defined commands, thus in principle
fully explaining the cognitive capacities of the human mind, Polanyi radically
rejected the comparison between mind and a Turing machine, arguing that the
human mind is not to be subjected to the tyranny of material mechanisms (Polanyi
1958, 261–264). In his writings he never tired from attacking logical positivism and
cybernetics, behaviorism, and Soviet Communism for throwing human freedom and
free choice overboard and thus degrading humans to robots (Polanyi 1951; Polanyi
1958, 36–37, 369–373). From the perspective of this aversion, it comes as no
surprise that Polanyi did not wish to ascribe a very privileged position to
instruments in the context of epistemology of science. Of course, Polanyi as
physical chemist knew at the time that scientists cannot survive without instruments,
yet in his philosophy of science he conceived them as explicators which have the
ability to destroy the subtle play between distal and proximal parts of perception.
For Polanyi it was a horrible idea to make everything explicable and planned, be
it in a political system or a philosophical theory. Epistemological and moral
convictions come together here. ‘‘Every attempt to achieve complete control over
thought through explicit rules is in itself a contradiction, leading us astray at every
step and is a culturally destructive move’’ (Polanyi 1969, 156). Somewhat
polemically one could say that Polanyi joined an illustrious group of culturally
conservative defenders of humanist Western values, and this was for him a
fundamental issue in the Cold War era.
Perception and liberty
The tendency to understand the natural sciences in the light of values giving them
the status of a specific culture was gaining momentum since the nineteenth century.
At no other time did this culture have a stronger influence than during the period of
Cold War when the primary goal was to demonstrate the moral, political, cultural,
scientific, and technical superiority of Western democracies over communism. Thus
in 1953, during a famous congress on Science and Freedom held at the University of
Hamburg, Polanyi held the battle against communism to be unavoidable and ‘‘that
by founding institutions that promote science the state recognizes the existence
of a sphere of independent ideas and independent people, thus conceding that the
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demands of this sphere have the same status as the political and material interests of
society that are protected by the state’’ (Polanyi 1954, 26).6
The demand for autonomy of science in light of the practice of eugenics and
Auschwitz, Lyssenkoism, and Soviet communism had two entirely different faces
during the post-war period. For the sociologist Robert Merton this autonomy could
be insured only if science pursued the ideal of neutrality, value-free judgments, and
objectivity that would eliminate subjective elements. Universalism, non-partisan-
ship, organized skepticism, and communism were the norms that constitute truly
independent science (Merton 1985). Against Merton’s claim, Polanyi defended the
importance of passion and partisanship for scientific knowledge. His goal was to
protect the personal idiosyncrasy of knowledge against a complete explication. In
Merton’s scenario, establishing science as cultural accomplishment means the
assimilation of science to an interest- and value free situation given only in nature.
In Polanyi’s scenario, science as cultural accomplishment is established by the
autonomous individual, who may neither be subordinated to any political or
religious norms, nor may the autonomous individual subordinate itself to any
machines or media.
With this shift from epistemology to ethics, Polanyi introduced a topic into the
philosophy of science that Fleck had not explicitly dealt with in his writings before
the war. This was to be different in the postwar era. In 1960, one year before Fleck’s
death, the long forgotten and fatally ill scientist wrote ‘‘Toward a free and human
science’’ in response to a discussion in the journal Science which remained
unpublished during his life. There he complains that the cultural mission of science
has been damaged by becoming the midwife of politics and industry. Fleck insists
on the autonomy of science the recipe for which was to be his old theory of
the thought collective which he now summarizes, going beyond his earlier thesis
with the claim that epistemological activity consists of three inseparably linked
components: the subject, the object, and the community. Understanding their
interplay could enlighten the sciences as to the genesis of ideas and the nature of
scientific truth which changes from ‘‘something static and ossified into a dynamic,
developing creative human truth’’ (Fleck 1983c, 180). Fleck is more explicit here
than in his earlier texts in emphasizing that scientific activity is couched in a moral
context and that the goal should be to maintain a humane science. Nor had the
subject previously played such a dominant role. On both counts there is a noticeable
proximity to Polanyi.
I have digressed somewhat from the initial question about the relation of
perception and knowledge with regard to the respective media; by focusing on the
context in which these connections were closely intertwined, two things are to be
made clear. First of all, neither Polanyi nor Fleck was interested in achieving a one-
to-one transfer from one field of knowledge to another. Fleck referred in a most
general way to Gestalt psychology, using the concept of Gestalt and a few of its key
ideas. Not until twelve years after publishing his major work did he name Gestalt
psychology as a source for his approach. For Polanyi, the assimilative process was
more complex. He had recourse to Gestalt psychology, the psychophysiology of
6 On Polanyi’s political liberalism, cf. Jacobs and Mullins 2008.
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attentiveness, the physiology of the senses, and named countless other experimental
investigations in physiology in order to make his concept of tacit knowledge more
plausible. Polanyi was interested in circumscribing an entire field of phenomena, not
in a single doctrine. Decisive is the fact that he made the play of attentiveness, the
active formation of experience, and the perception of Gestalt in the sense of tacit
knowledge the sine qua non of the dynamics of scientific knowledge.
Second, epistemology cannot so easily escape the clutches of the very sciences it
is analyzing. Historical epistemology as well as the philosophy of science are
oriented in their approach toward specific sciences. This relation becomes viable in
the field of history and must therefore be observed there. As divergent as their
approaches may have otherwise been, modern physics was the main source for the
metatheories of Bachelard and Carnap; for Fleck and Polanyi it was Gestalt
psychology which was sufficiently scientific to refuse the reduction of logical and
instrumental conditions for knowledge production; and sufficiently humanistic to
preserve the idea of free human beings creatively working in the sciences. It is
precisely this continuity between the physiological conditions of the sense apparatus
and the complex epistemic operations that Fleck and Polanyi took for granted. A
shift of epistemic energy from the sense organs to scientific devices, as Bachelard
postulates, is excluded here just as is the assumption of a rupture, a break as the
decisive motivating force in the dynamics of knowledge. Fleck and Polanyi
acknowledge discontinuities and shifts, too, but these are adapted to the formation
of Gestalt, that is, a changed attitude toward thought. That means that they are
honed to the speed of psychophysiological and social processes and not to
technological innovations that are continuously producing new devices.
Conclusions
What conclusions may we draw from all this for historical epistemology? With
regard to its history, it is evident that prior to Kuhn’s discovery of Fleck in the 1960s
and his confession that many of his ideas could be found in the work of the Polish
bacteriologist, Fleck was basically unknown in the community of philosophers of
science. As I see it, this has to do with the fact that the latter as well as sociologists
of science were in search of a certitude—after the experiences of National Socialism
and Stalinism and the desire for epistemological-political robustness in times of
Cold War—provided by the description and interpretation of scientific knowledge
(Reisch 2005). Fleck placed precisely these certitudes in question. It is well-known
that Kuhn’s Psychology of Research first laid the groundwork on which the germs of
Fleck’s theory could gradually take hold and thrive. With this, the camera shifted its
focus away from the hard criteria of logic and instruments to the so-called soft
criteria of thought style and social communities.
Polanyi was not in need of historical midwifery. His solid connection between
knowledge and morality was clearly the consequence of his experiences in the
age of extremes. It followed that the positing of the ‘‘mute force’’ would serve to
preserve the realm of science from planning, patronization, and remote control.
With this position, a knowledge free of all possible social, technological, and
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economic contaminants is postulated. This epistemological concept, which makes
the assumption of implicit knowledge into an indispensable precondition of the
explicit, did not find resonance among proponents of the theory of science oriented
toward objectivity and logic. People were wary of metaphysical assumptions
without evidence which, in a very different way, undermine purified rational
knowledge systems. Nor did historians of science really warm to Polanyi’s theses. If
certain knowledge is not explainable, they objected, it is not accessible to adequate
historical or sociological study either.
With the emergence of the so-called practical turn in the 1980s, the shift in
emphasis from theory to the practice of sciences, Polanyi’s reflections were taken up
again and refined. Harry Collins, for example, saw in experimental practice much
more than just a set of rules for testing theories. The manner in which an
experimental design is constructed, how instruments are used, and how knowledge
circulates in a work group contains elements that are locally anchored and cannot be
precisely explicated. Collins calls this the ‘‘enculturational versus algorithmical
conception of scientific practice’’ and has subsequently developed a comprehensive
sociological theory of tacit knowledge (Collins 1992, 56–57, 171; Collins 2010).
Since the 1990s, science studies, while focusing on the material context of
instruments and apparatus, have also taken into consideration craftsmanship and
skill, physical discipline, and the dependence of information on local conditions.
This balanced perspective, taking into account the material and the social conditions
of scientific knowledge production likewise, has been responsible for avoiding a
technological or instrumental determinism in historical epistemology, such as can
often be observed in the media sciences. This could be one of the most important
consequences of working with Fleck and Polanyi’s theories. On the one hand, it was
not possible to learn from either one about the significance of the media or
instruments because they both favored a model of knowledge that underestimated
the importance of media, thus setting the limits of their theories. On the other hand,
it was quite possible to learn from them that media are also incorporated into a
complex network of action that does not follow one single logic or order. Both Fleck
and Polanyi pointed out that the relation of perception and knowledge is multi-
faceted, more so than suggested by the ideas of the substitution of perception
through logic or instruments.
In the meantime, Gestalt psychology has become history and can no longer
assume the role it played for Fleck and Polanyi. Science studies have gladly taken
the historical and sociological components of their theories into their fold, yet the
psychological aspects have been abandoned. One should not overlook the fact that
there is a fundamental difference between Kuhn’s ‘‘psychology’’ and Collins’
‘‘enculturation.’’ The question, whether or not the psychophysiology of senses can
be productively used for historical epistemology, is not on the agenda of current
discussions. There may be good reasons for this absence, because an answer to this
question would not be able to avoid the fact that cognitive psychology has since
been situated under the protectorate of the neurosciences. Is something like
neuroepistemology appearing on the horizon, comparable to neuromarketing or
neuroaesthetics which claim to make meaningful statements about the perception of
our world? I don’t think so, but after the social and material components of the
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origin of knowledge have been thoroughly examined, it might perhaps be
worthwhile to look at scientific practices again in light of anthropological and
psychological cross connections and roots, taking experience, intuition, discipline,
and convention into consideration.
Why should experimental works of actual laboratory research not be taken into
consideration together with historical, ethnological, and sociological investigations?
Such a project has hardly been ventured, but perhaps we would be more trusting
of such an undertaking were we to remember that the link between psychology
and epistemology, enabling the fundamental expansion of our understanding of the
dynamic and complexity of scientific knowledge, was forged but a few short
decades ago.
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